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Abstract 
This paper aims to identify the determinants of performance of the Tunisian banking sector. The results 
found, following an empirical study using panel data of Tunisian banks listed on the stock market over the 
period 2000-2013, show that credit risk, liquidity, total assets and disclosure of information relating to 
credit are the main determinants of banking performance 
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Introduction 
The revival of global economic activity since 2010 was 
quickly reversed in an economic recession and financial 
distress in 2011. This reversal was due to the crisis of 
sovereign debt in some countries of the Euro zone, 
soaring prices of raw materials on the international 
market and socio-political instability in some golf 
countries and North Africa. 
In Tunisia, since the revolution of 2011, the 
deterioration of the main macroeconomic indicators1 
and socio-political instability affected the banking 
system in terms of liquidity reduction and increased 
risks. 
                                                             
1 The inflation rate has increased from 3 to 6%, the 
unemployment rate of 13.9 to 17%, the debt ratio of 
40% of GDP to 45% of GDP 
The Tunisian banking system described reduced and 
focused enough. Indeed, on a set of 21 banks, the first 
four, including three states, hold more than half of the 
overall total assets of the banking system. Non-
performing loans are quite high. They represent 13.5% 
of total credit in 20122. These loans have increased as 
well the volume of bad loans as the risk of insolvency. 
The stock market bank, which represents nearly 55% of 
the benchmark index, suffered a loss of over 15% in 
2013. Tunisian banks prefer the logic of speculation and 
profit maximization rather than the logic funding and 
development of the economy. 
Despite some privatization transactions mergers and 
acquisitions3, foreign participation in the Tunisian 
                                                             
2 17.8% for public banks and 10.6% for private banks 
3 The acquisition by general society in 2002 the shares 
of the state in the UIB for an amount of approximately 
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banking system is low compared to countries in the 
region. This reflects the weaknesses of financial 
services, including FDI flows. 
Monetary policy has been affected by practical direct 
administration of the credit. The capital market remains 
underdeveloped, which is the source of a significant 
rigidity rates. The monetary authorities take action to 
ensure the liquidity of the banking system, which was 
weakened by the weight of nonperforming loans, and 
act directly on the volume of loans. 
All reforms since the early 90s for the restructuring and 
modernization of the Tunisian banking sector did not 
lead to the desired result in terms of financing the 
economy and diversifying risks. In addition, the 
Tunisian banking sector is not dynamic and renovating. 
It works according to conventional financing, less risky 
and more profitable. 
However, despite these limitations, the Tunisian 
banking sector remains strong and resistant. This 
resistance is due to, on one hand, to the support and 
assistance of the central bank in controlling and 
refinancing and the state for the bailouts, especially for 
public banks, on the other hand. 
The objective of this paper is to determine the factors of 
performance of the Tunisian banking system. The 
empirical analysis using panel data is carried out on a 
sample of listed Tunisian banks during the period 2000-
2013. The results found shows that credit risk, liquidity, 
size, and credit information’s availability are the main 
factors of bank performance in Tunisia. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: the first section 
reviews the main work on the determinants of bank 
profitability. The second section focuses on 
methodology, definitions of variables and sample. The 
third section presents the model and the interpretation of 
empirical results followed by conclusion in final 
section. 
Literature Review 
The financing of the economy thesis goes back to the 
writings of Schumpeter (1912), which had emphasized 
the key role of bankers. These later through, targeting 
and financing entrepreneurs encourage technological 
innovation, capital accumulation and thus stimulate 
growth. The Schumpeterian approach to finance and 
development is based on the role of banks in terms of 
productivity growth and technological change. The 
                                                                                                
US $ 100 million. The sale of 13% of the Bank of 
Tunisia in 2012 to a Luxembourg investment funds 
accumulation of capital is the key to economic growth. 
Banks must contribute through money creation as well 
as the mobilization and allocation of savings. 
The role of banks in the financing and development of 
the economy, changes according to the specific 
conditions of each country. According to McKinnon and 
Shaw(1973) for developing economies, the state 
imposed the level of interest rates, used direct 
instruments of monetary control, imposed higher 
reserve requirement rate and allocated credit for sector. 
This situation led to a misallocation of bank resources, 
corned out the chances of developing the private sector 
and allowed governments to use seigniorage4 to finance 
their budget deficits. Therefore, the banking sector did 
not ensure its intermediation role. It did not collect 
savings efficiently and did not provide credit to 
productive sectors, thus limiting opportunities for 
investment and growth rates. 
At the micro-economic level, Rajan (1998a) shows that 
the bank holds significant informational advantages 
over other financial intermediaries. These benefits are 
related to monopolization the business management 
system of payments of the economy which is the only 
one to ensure. Indeed, the conduct and monitoring of 
deposit accounts enable it to collect private 
information5. This information will then be used to 
maintain its relationship with its customers (Scialom, 
1999), and to know the preference for money to its 
customers and to pool the risk of sudden withdrawal of 
deposits. The bank is also seen as a liquidity insurance. 
In the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the 
presence of the bank as an alternative to the market is 
related to the better liquidity assurance that for 
depositors as well as borrowers. 
At the macroeconomic level, the money creation power 
has two diametrically opposite effects on the real 
economy. On the one hand, it is beneficial to economic 
growth to the extent that the financing of productive 
capital is made from scratch and is no longer subject to 
ex-ante savings collected. On the other hand, it is 
harmful for growth because of inflationary pressure 
effect. 
                                                             
4 Seigniorage income is defined as the amount of 
harvested resources by the authorities by issuing more 
currency "Central Bank" as necessary for private 
agents and financial intermediaries 
5The private information includes: The regular income, 
consumption patterns, savings capacity, payment 
incidents, etc. 
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The bank holds due to its monetary and financial 
intermediary function, that distinguish from the other 
financial intermediaries. However, it’s considered heart 
of the instability of the financial system through taking 
risks sometimes considered excessive. 
The risks and dangers are amplified for an economy 
transiting from a state of autarky to a state of financial 
openness, resulting in inappropriate deregulation of the 
banking business. The crises of the 90s of the Southeast 
Asian countries begin from a banking crisis. 
In the same context, Gutentag and Herring (1986) 
shows that banks behave as "blindness to disaster."6 
Their activity follows a speculative logic which 
disconnects them from the evolution of income in the 
real economy. Banks are now drawn into a debt 
dynamic leading them to be more sensitive to the 
probability of failure (Scialom, 1999). This dynamic is 
characterized by an increase in loans granted, supported 
by the increase in the borrowing capacity of individuals. 
Since then, international instances, such as the 
International Monetary Founds and the World Bank 
have imposed strict prudential banking regulations to 
avoid any risk of bank failure. The banks have 
developed an internal system of analysis and filtering of 
information required from the borrowers and 
management of credit risks on the other hand. 
Empirically, studies have found mixed results of the 
relationship between bank performance and its various 
determinants. The relationship varies according to the 
particular case of each bank and to the economic, legal 
and institutional conditions of its environment. 
The work of Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996), Altunbas et al. 
(2004) and Godlewski (2004) have found a negative 
relationship between the level of risk and bank 
performance. This indicates that an increase in the level 
of risk the bank systematically lead to a decline in 
performance and vice versa. The work of Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1998) show, using bank data for 80 
countries over a period from 1988 to 1995, that bank 
profitability is linked to macroeconomic and fiscal 
conditions, prudential regulations, financial structure of 
banks and underlying legal and institutional conditions. 
They find that: 
i. The most capitalized banks and net interest 
margins are more profitable 
                                                             
6 The hypothesis of "disaster myopia" includes the idea 
of a bias in the estimation of subjective probabilities 
that bankers give to events that may disrupt their 
business. 
ii. Banks that relied heavily on deposits are 
unprofitable 
iii. Inflation is positively associated with 
higher interest margins 
iv. The effectiveness of the legal and 
institutional system and the absence of 
corruption decrease interest margins and 
affect bank profitability. 
This overview of theoretical and empirical literature on 
the determinants of bank profitability enabled us to 
formulate the following hypothesis: bank performance 
is linked to microeconomic factors specific to the bank 
and to independent macroeconomic factors as well. 
Research and Methodology 
Choice of the sample 
An empirical study focusing on determinants bank 
performance has neglected Tunisian banks in their 
sample. Thus the choice of examination of the 
determinants bank performance is carried on all listed 
Tunisian banks in bourses. These banks are divided into 
three state banks (BNA, BH and STB), seven private 
banks (Amen Bank, ATB, Attijari Bank, BIAT, BT, 
UBCI,UIB) and a Mixed Bank (BTE). They represent 
more than 80% of the Tunisian banking and finance 
more than ¾ of the economy.  
Table 1 shows that during the period (2000-2013), the 
bank performance and its determinants vary with the 
nature of each bank (state banking, private banking or 
mixed bank). The average growth rate in revenues is 
13%. This rate implicitly reflects a slightly reassuring 
performance. Credit risk is sustainable, it reach 7.45% 
signaling that the recovery of assets within the time is 
still achieved. The liquidity ratio is 95.12%. This rate, 
which is less than unity7, is deemed insufficient to meet 
the bank's obligations at maturity. We note that the 
state-owned banks (BH, BNA, STB) are less efficient 
and less liquid than private banks. Similarly, the weight 
of equity in the capital structure of banks does not 
exceed 12.5% of total assets. This rate indicates the 
weakness of the financial autonomy of these banks. On 
average these banks are called quasi-efficient, less 
liquid and less risky. 
                                                             
7According to Article 13 of the Circular 91-24 BCT 
Banks must always respect a liquidity ratio that cannot 
be less than 100% 
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Table 1: Description of variables by banks (average for the period 2000-2013) 
                            Variables 
Banks 
Growth rate 
of total assets 
Growth rate of 
net banking 
income  
Credit risk 
Liquidity 
ratio 
Equity to total 
assets “EQTA” 
Amen Bank (AB)  0,148 0,102 0,087 1,013 0,088 
ArabTunisian Bank (ATB) 0,16 0,127 0,089 1,416 0,089 
Attijari Bank 0,111 0,08 0,06 1,076 0,077 
Housing Bank (BH) 
 
0,094 0,058 0,061 0,818 0,075 
Arab International Bank of 
Tunisia (BIAT) 
0,105 0,078 0,065 1,307 0,131 
National Agricultural Bank 
(BNA) 
0,08 0,059 0,068 0,881 0,089 
Bank of Tunisia (BT) 0,097 0,063 0,068 0,868 0,154 
Tunisia and Emirates Bank 
(BTE) 
0,308 0,388 0,036 0,342 0,378 
Tunisian Society Banks (STB) 0,087 0,051 0,077 0,850 0,088 
Union Bank for Trade and 
Industry (UBCI) 
0,094 0,047 0,091 0,945 0,114 
International Union of Banks 
(UIB) 
0,435 0,376 0,117 0,948 0,085 
Mean 0,156 0,13 0,075 0,951 0,124 
Source: author's work 
Variables: definitions and measurements 
Endogenous variable: the banking performance is 
measured by the rate of growth in Net Banking Income 
(NBI) which is equal to the banking operations months 
banking expenses 
Explanatory variables: six variables are used to identify 
the determinants of bank performance. These variables 
are related to the specific characteristics of the bank and 
to its macroeconomic and institutional environment. 
Variables specific to the bank 
Credit Risk is the most alarming risk to the bank. It 
reflects the importance of its non-performing debts. 
Effective management of credit risk is very important 
for the survival and stability of banking institutions. For 
the assessment of this risk, banks must distinguish their 
balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet in to: 
- Assets "Current" means assets having a full recovery 
in time. 
- Assets "classified" according to the risk of loss and the 
probability of recovery. 
Class 1: Assets requiring special monitoring: 
Class 2: uncertain Assets 
Class 3: Assets of concern or threatened 
Class 4: Active or bad compromise 
Size: large banks are more accommodated in the 
consolidation and financing of the economy and less 
vulnerable to imperfect competition. Indeed, we 
consider that the total assets of Tunisian banks, which 
consist largely of customer deposits, have a positive 
effect on the bank performance. However, this effect 
can be reversed if the deposits are used for speculative 
purposes. 
Liquidity Ratio: structure is an important indicator for 
the bank. Liquidity allows the bank to meet its 
obligations and to fulfill its economy finance function. 
Indeed, a high liquidity ratio increases the banking 
performance. 
Financial Structure: it is measured by the ratio of 
"equity relative to total assets". This ratio reflects the 
financial autonomy of the bank. It determines the 
distribution of its sources of financing between debt and 
equity. Thus, the more this ratio is, the less the bank is 
risky and the bank's profitability is low.  
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Variable of monetary stability (Inflation): Price stability 
is essential for several reasons. First, if inflation is low, 
the target of positive real interest rates is reaches. Then, 
in a moderate and low volatile inflation environment, 
nominal interest rates are not excessively high and 
permit for avoid the problem of bankruptcy of indebted 
financial institutions. Banks are no longer forced to 
engage in a price war to attract the maximum deposits. 
Thus, a high inflation rate may affect the bank interest 
margin. 
Institutional Variable: Index of Credit Information: 
The extent of the availability and reliability of the 
information provided by private and public 
organizations facilitates the bank crediting decision. An 
increase in this range, reduces the information 
asymmetry between informed investors and uninformed. 
In this context, uninformed investors abandon the search 
for private information that becomes costly. These 
results have practical relevance as well as for the stock 
agencies of companies, especially banks. According to 
the World Bank, the index of credit information varies 
from 0 to 8. The higher the value, the greater the credit 
information is available. 
In summary, Table 2 shows the measurement and the 
expected impact of all variables in the model. 
 
Table 2: definition and measurement of variables8 
Variables Proxy Predicted 
coefficient sign 
Dependant variable 
bank performance, noted “NBI” measured by the rate of growth in net banking income (NBI) 
which is equal to the banking operations months banking 
expenses 
- 
Independant variables 
Credit risk, noted "credit risk"  Estimated by the ratio between provisions and outstanding 
credit to the customer 
Negative 
Liquidity, noted "liquidity"  Estimated by the ratio between loans and customer loans Positive 
Size, noted "size"  Estimated by total assets growth rate Positive 
Financial structure, noted 
"EQTA" " 
Estimated by the ratio 'equity relative to total assets Positive 
Index of credit information, 
denoted "information"  
The index ranges from 0 to 8. The higher the value, the 
greater the credit information is available and reliable.  
Positive 
Inflation, noted "inflation"  Estimated by the general price index to the consumer Uncertain 
                                                             
8 All variables are from World Development Indicators (WDI), the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT), the professional 
association of Tunisian banks (APBT) and annual reports of listed Tunisian banks in stock market from2000 to 2013. 
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Estimate model 
The consideration of individual data priori leads us to 
estimate panel data to better understand the factors that 
explain the bank performance. Our empirical analysis is 
based on annual data for a sample of eleven listed banks 
over the period 1990-2013. 
The general model specification takes the following 
form:  
titiiti VEy ,,, eba ++=  
;w here, Yit is the growth rate of net banking income 
(NBI), VE is he explanatory variables and eit is the error 
term, with E (eit1) = 0 and E (eit
2) = s2e 
First, we test the existence of a common assumption of 
constant for all banks 
[ ]).11,1:( 0 Î"= iH i aa  
If this hypothesis is rejected, we obtain the following 
model with individual effects: 
titiiti VEy ,,, eba ++=  (1);
iideeu itititi ®+= ,,e  
The test result of the individual effects follows a Fisher 
statistic F (10, 122) which is equal to 0.71. At a degree 
of risk of 5% we accept the null hypothesis of equality 
of constants i
a
(p-value> 5%). Therefore it is necessary 
to introduce the individual effects of each bank. The 
structure of the panel is completely homogeneous 
(pooled model). The final specification of the model is 
as follows: tititi
VEy ,,, eba ++= (2)
[ ] [ ]2013,1990,11,1 Î"Î" ti  
Results and Discussion 
The estimation results9 of Models 1 and 2 are 
summarized in Table 3: 
- Model 1 expresses the banking performance based on 
specific variables to the bank:  
Y1it = β1 (credit risk)it + β2 (Liquidity)it + β3 (size)it + eit 
[ ] [ ]2013,1990,11,1 Î"Î" ti  
- Model 2 expresses the banking performance based on 
all variables:  
                                                             
9 The results of Models 1 and 2 are derived with poled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) using STATA 2013 
Y2it = β1 (credit risk)it + β2 (Liquidity)it + β3 (size)it + 
β4 (inflation)it + β5 (information)it + eit 
[ ] [ ]2013,1990,11,1 Î"Î" ti  
 
Table 3 : Estimate Results 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
The results in Table 3 show that except for the inflation 
rate, credit risk, liquidity, size and quality of 
information are significant and have the expected sign: 
i. Credit risk is negative and significant (-4.18). 
This result shows that poor management of 
assets classified led to increased credit risk 
and therefore a loss on the interest margin. 
This credit risk is sustainable11 for the recovery 
of debts of the bank at maturity; it requires 
special monitoring because of the importance 
of its harmful impact on bank profitability. 
ii. The liquidity ratio is positive and significant 
(3.3). It means that monetary availability 
improves bank performance. While a lack of 
liquidity may result in an inability of the bank 
to meet its obligations and its cash 
commitments to creditors at maturity. 
                                                             
10Taking the logarithm of the variable has eliminated 
negative ones of the sample. Thus the number of 
observations has dropped from 154 to139. 
11 On average the risk is equal to 7.45% for all banks. It 
is part of class 1 (active requiring special monitoring). 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
Credit risk -0.478*** -0.532*** 
 (0.127) (0.127) 
Liquidity 0.249*** 0.311*** 
 (0.0924) (0.0941) 
Size 0.367*** 0.350*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0520) 
EQTA 0.0990 0.0714 
 (0.113) (0.112) 
Information  0.181** 
  (0.0702) 
Inflation  -0.0414 
  (0.138) 
Constant -0.0525 -0.347 
 (0.462) (0.502) 
   
Observations 13910 139 
R-squared 0.399 0.428 
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iii. The size of the bank is positive and significant 
(6.73). This result means that bank 
performance is accompanied by total assets 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2001 and Guru 
et al, 2002). Besides, the big banks are 
accommodated in the consolidation, financing 
of the economy and in risk diversification. 
iv. The financial structure (EQTA) is positive and 
not significant (0.64). Thus, bank performance 
is insensitive to the bank's funding sources and 
financial autonomy. 
v. The index of credit information is positive and 
significant (2.58). The higher the index, the 
higher the information is available and 
reliable. The extent of the relevance and 
reliability of information reduces credit risk 
and increases the bank performance. 
vi. Inflation is negative and not significant (-
0.3).This result corroborates that of Hanson 
and Rocha (1986), it implies that monetary 
stability does not necessarily affect Tunisian 
bank performance. 
In short, the empirical analysis shows that our initial 
hypothesis is not fully proved. In fact, the performance  
of Tunisian banks listed on the stock market is related 
to: 
i. Good management of non-performing debts for 
better control credit risk. 
ii. Reassuring liquidity to meet the Bank's 
obligations in regulation time. 
iii. Sufficient size to allow the bank to withstand 
market credit and better manage risk sub-
adjacent, 
iv. Reliable information to avoid any risk arising 
from the lending. 
However, this banking performance seems insensitive to 
the financial structure of banks and the inflation rate of 
the economy. 
Conclusion 
The descriptive analysis of the factors relating to the 
banking performance shows that the Tunisian banking 
sector has relatively advanced in the financing of the 
economy and the risk management. The decline of some 
indicators of structure and performance is justified by 
the indulgence of banks, especially state, who have 
neglected the necessary precautions in terms of 
provisions and real guarantees before granting loans. 
Empirical analysis show that the credit risk 
management, liquidity, size, and disclosure of credit 
information are the main determinants of bank 
performance in Tunisia. Thus in 2011, the monetary 
authorities in the central bank case, responded to 
implement a process of reforms aimed at monitoring 
and supervision of these indicators to ensure the 
durability and performance of banks. 
These reforms need to be continued and strengthened 
through the establishment of good governance and 
effective legal and institutional environment. However, 
the introduction of these reforms should be progressive, 
gradual and timed manner according to the 
characteristics and specificities of each bank. Their 
positive impact on value creation, optimal resource 
allocation and risk diversification requires that the 
choice of these reforms come from the needs of the 
economy. 
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